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I. INTRODUCTION
Spotify Technology S.A. (Spotify) was the first high-profile
direct listing, and the first issuer to conduct a direct listing on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)1 under new NYSE rules
1. Roger Aitken, Will Spotify’s $30B NYSE ‘Non-IPO’ Direct Listing Hit the Spot?,
FORBES (Apr. 3, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/04/03
/will-spotifys-30b-nyse-non-ipo-direct-listing-hit-the-spot/#7fa4a57a1a35.
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approved in February 2018 by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).2 Prior to the listing, the “unicorn”3 reached a
$19 billion private valuation in 2017.4 By the time of the listing,
Spotify had built a strong consumer brand with seventy-one
million paying users, raised around $2.7 billion in funding from
Silicon Valley heavyweights including Kleiner Perkins, Accel, and
Founders Fund.5 Spotify collects subscription fees upfront,6 so the
company did not need to raise funds in an initial public offering
(IPO)—one of the traditional benefits of an IPO. Adding to the
unique set of facts, the Swedish music-streaming startup was not
then listed on any other exchange, even in its home country, and
did not disclose any plan to list—and has not since listed—on an
exchange other than the NYSE.
Many companies like Spotify eventually offer their shares to
investors in an IPO to raise capital, provide liquidity to
shareholders, create acquisition flexibility, advertise, and validate
the company.7 By choosing a direct listing instead, Spotify signaled
something much different. Naturally, under these unique
circumstances, the direct listing was eagerly anticipated. Investors,
lawyers, analysts, and other executives carefully observed the
Spotify direct listing and its aftermath, and many surmised
that if Spotify’s process was successful, other large, consumer-

2. Andrew Brady, Phyllis Korff & Michael Zeidel, New NYSE Rules for Non-IPO
Listings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 24, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/24/new-nyse-rules-for-non-ipo-listings/.
3. In Silicon Valley parlance, a “unicorn” is a startup valued over $1 billion. Unicorns
have become increasingly less fantastical since 2010 as private fund sizes have increased. See
Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV.
583, 587–88, 641 (2016).
4. Tom Zanki, Spotify Touts ‘Transparency’ of Direct Stock Listing, LAW360 (Mar. 15,
2018, 10:22 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/1022737.
5. Katie Roof & Josh Constine, Spotify Has Filed to Go Public, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28,
2018, 12:56 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/28/spotify-has-filed-to-go-public/.
6. Erin Griffith, Spotify and the Triumph of the Subscription Model, WIRED
(Apr. 3, 2018, 7:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/spotify-and-the-triumph-of-thesubscription-model/.
7. See Kyla Houge, Reverse Mergers: A Legitimate Method for Companies to Go Public or
an Easy Way to Commit Fraud?, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUDICIARY 325, 337 (2016) (noting that one
reason a company might pursue an IPO “is to raise its overall profile”); Jesse Scott,
The JOBS Act: Encouraging Capital Formation but Not IPOs, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
367, 368 (2014); Matthew Zolnierz, Article, VI. Dual-Listed IPOs, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
65, 66–71 (2016).
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facing companies might eschew an IPO and opt for a direct
listing instead.8
However, adoption of the direct listing approach may have
negative consequences. The IPO procedures attempt to ensure that
investors receive material information in a standardized form.
Securities laws mandate that companies conducting an IPO provide
detailed disclosures regarding past business performance and
continuing quarterly, annual, and event-based disclosures
after the IPO.9
Unlike an IPO, a direct listing is performed by a company that
lists its existing shares on one of the U.S. exchanges, like Nasdaq or
the NYSE, without offering newly issued shares to public
investors.10 The difference is essentially captured in the name—
there is no initial public offering of newly created shares, just a
listing of existing shares that can then be traded by the pre-direct
listing stockholders. Often, direct listings are employed by
companies already listed on international exchanges hoping to
increase investor confidence by also listing the shares on a
U.S. exchange.11
Direct listings, independent of listing on international
exchanges, provide less information for potential investors,
because investors do not have the assurance that the offering has
been vetted and the price set by an investment bank. In addition,
some foreign-based companies can qualify as “foreign private
issuers,” and thereby enjoy relaxed disclosure requirements as
compared to domestic corporations.12 Just one of these
characteristics—a direct listing or a foreign private issuer—exposes
investors to more risk than a traditional public offering or listing.
Coupled together, a foreign private issuer conducting a direct
listing leaves investors with more information asymmetry than
may be healthy for the market. Therefore, if a foreign private issuer

8. See Yelena Dunaevsky, Is Spotify’s Direct Listing a Harbinger of Change in U.S. Capital
Markets?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.bna.com/spotifys-direct-listingb57982090675/; Robert Pozen, Spotify’s Direct Listing is a Template for Unicorns Riding
High, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/46a35692-01ce-11e8-96509c0ad2d7c5b5.
9. 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308, 249.308a, 249.310 (2014).
10. See Houge, supra note 7.
11. See Zolnierz, supra note 7, at 67–68.
12. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018).
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is offering securities only on a U.S. exchange as part of a direct
listing and is not listed on any foreign exchange that requires
periodic disclosures, the foreign private issuer should not be
exempt from disclosure requirements of U.S. securities laws and
regulations from which they are currently exempted.
Thus far, the Spotify direct listing has been heralded as a novel
approach to going public.13 In the days following the listing, it was
lauded by many as a success with relatively little volatility in the
market price.14
According to one author writing shortly after the listing,
“Spotify seems pretty clearly to have accomplished the goals of
increasing liquidity and reducing volatility for its shareholders.”15
Hopefuls predicted that if the stock continues to perform well,
other companies will follow the pattern,16 while detractors argue
that the direct listing will not catch on and the hype is unfounded.17
Many skeptics expressed concern that the traditional IPO process is
a proven model of success most companies will not risk
abandoning and point to similar excitement and predictions
around Alphabet’s 2004 Dutch Auction and its failure to change the
IPO status quo.18

13. Matt Levine, Spotify’s Non-IPO Really Is Novel, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2018, 7:55 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-04/spotify-s-non-ipo-really-is-novel.
14. See Ben Sisario & Matt Phillips, Spotify’s Wall Street Debut Is a Success, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/business/media/spotifys-wallstreet-debut-is-a-success.html; Colin Stutz, Spotify Stocks Find Stability Following Sell-Offs to
Close First Week of Public Trading, BILLBOARD (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.billboard.com
/articles/business/8293424/spotify-stocks-close-first-week-trading-stability-sell-offs;
Renaissance Capital IPO Research, U.S. IPO Weekly Recap: Spotify Dances to Its Own Tune with
a $32 Billion Listing, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 7, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://seekingalpha.com
/article/4161595-u-s-ipo-weekly-recap-spotify-dances-tune-32-billion-listing.
15. Matt Levine, Spotify’s Non-IPO Wasn’t Much of an IPO, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5,
2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-05/spotify-s-nonipo-wasn-t-much-of-an-ipo.
16. See Dunaevsky, supra note 8; Pozen, supra note 8.
17. Renaissance Capital IPO Research, Spotify, Google and Facebook: Tech Giants Have a
Spotty Record Spurning Wall Street, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 7, 2018, 9:18 AM),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4161591-spotify-google-facebook-tech-giants-spottyrecord-spurning-wall-street.
18. Id. See generally Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online
Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 227–32 (2015) [hereinafter Hurt, Pricing
Disintermediation]; Christine Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us About Internet Auctions (And
What It Can), 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 403, 403 (2006) [hereinafter Hurt, What Google] (arguing that
despite difficulties in the auction process, Google’s IPO was successful in some of its goals
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In the months since Spotify’s direct listing in April 2018, there
has been more instability.19 The stock price increased to just over
$196 per share in July 2018, dipped to a low of about $109 in
December 2018, and, at the time this Note was submitted to be
published, the price was about $130, nearly even with the trading
price at the end of the first day of trading.20 Despite the fluctuation,
which reflected the market more generally,21 commentators have
largely agreed that the listing was “at least a non-failure,” and that
despite the warnings “the direct listing has yielded a remarkably
stable stock,”22 which was, after all, the goal. Even more telling
regarding the success of Spotify’s direct listing is that predictions

and would “surely have some impact on the future of U.S. IPOs”). Alphabet, operating as
Google at the time, partly in an effort to showcase the power of the internet to democratize
the IPO process and Alphabet’s commitment to its audience, chose an auction process to
allow interested bidders who registered with the company and opened a qualifying account
with one of the participating investment banks to submit bids for the purchase of shares to
any of the twenty-eight underwriters. See Hurt, What Google, at 422–23. The bids could be
submitted over the internet, by telephone or fax, or by hand delivery and could be
withdrawn or changed by the bidder and accepted or rejected by Google. Id. at 423. The
company then used the submitted bids to calculate the IPO price. Id. at 423–24. Despite
Alphabet’s intentions, the process was marred by nine amendments to the registration
statement, bad timing, the disclosure of an SEC investigation against Alphabet, industrywide and company-specific negative press, and disclosure of a potential violation of the SECimposed quiet period by the publication of a Playboy magazine interview with the founders,
among other hiccups. Id. at 415–25. Though the process worked generally, and the
registration statement was declared effective, subsequent analyst interest focused on the
strong performance of the stock over the months that followed. The auction process was
largely passed over in the aftermath (except, of course, by legal scholars). As one reporter
wrote, “[t]here’s a reason that people still talk about Google’s Dutch auction IPO, 15 years
later: [B]ecause it didn’t inspire imitators. It didn’t become a standard tool of corporate
finance, an option that is on the table for every company.” Matt Levine, Direct Listings are a
Thing Now, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles
/2019-01-11/direct-listings-are-a-thing-now.
19. Yahoo! Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SPOT/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2019, 4:58 PM); see also Dan Rys, Spotify Stock Slips to Lowest Price Since Going Public as Market
Falls Overall, BILLBOARD (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business
/8490710/spotify-stock-slips-lowest-price-since-public-market-falls-overall.
20. Yahoo! Finance.
21. See Rys, supra note 19.
22. Levine, supra note 18; see also Theodore Schleifer, Spotify Tried to Reinvent the IPO,
But Two Quarters Later, Things Look . . . Normal?, RECODE (Jul. 26, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.recode.net/2018/7/26/17615094/spotify-ipo-earnings-direct-listing (noting
that despite predictions the stock price would be volatile, it wasn’t during its first
two quarters).
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that other companies might follow suit are proving true.23 Most
recently, Slack Technologies Inc. (Slack), which offers a cloud-based
team collaboration tool,24 has filed paperwork for a direct listing.25
Unlike Alphabet’s auction, which has, thus far, gone down in
history as “just a weird thing that Google did once,”26 if a second
large company like Slack or Airbnb, which is also considering a
direct listing27, follows Spotify’s approach, direct listings are “much
more likely to become a thing.”28 In short, with the follow of Slack,
Spotify’s direct listing may well have paved the path to
renegotiation of the established IPO process.29
With changes in the status quo, it is likely investors will face
increased risk. Securities laws are meant to sufficiently protect
shareholders while promoting capital formation and preserving
confidence in the stock market.30 Spotify’s success with the direct
listing is encouraging more direct listings. If the process is
embraced, especially by foreign private issuers, the shift could push
the balance against investor protection in favor of capital formation
and market confidence. The approach may lead to increased capital
formation and market confidence in the short term, but, as
demonstrated by recent reforms,31 if the securities regime fails to
adequately protect investors, the short-term benefits of direct
listings will eventually be extinguished as investors refuse to
embrace the risks of investing in a public market full of unknowns.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I provides background
information regarding (1) the regular IPO process and its
23. Theodore Schleifer, Airbnb and Slack Are Considering Untraditional IPOs That Box
Out
Bankers
Like
Spotify
Did,
RECODE
(Dec.
10,
2018,
12:46
PM),
https://www.recode.net/2018/12/10/18129880/airbnb-postmates-slack-direct-listing-ipo;
see also Maureen Farrell, Slack Plans to Follow Spotify on Unconventional IPO Route, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2019, 5:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-planning-to-pursuedirect-listing-11547202723 (noting that Spotify’s stock “had little volatility”).
24. See SLACK, http://slack.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2019, 11:28 AM).
25. Maureen Farrell, Slack Files to Go Public With Direct Listing, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4,
2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-files-confidentially-to-go-public-withdirect-listing-11549301336 (noting that “Spotify executed its direct listing with nary a hiccup
in April 2018, garnering publicity for the method in the process”).
26. Levin, supra note 18.
27. See Schleifer, supra note 23.
28. Levin, supra note 18.
29. Id.
30. See Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005).
31. See generally Scott, supra note 7 (analyzing the shortcomings in impact of the JOBS
Act on IPOs and capital formation).
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requirements, (2) the direct listing process and its requirements, (3)
the significance of foreign private issuers and dual- or cross-listing,
and (4) the details regarding Spotify’s direct listing. Part II
examines the purpose of the IPO process—to protect investors by
mandating disclosures—and the attempts of Congress and the SEC
to alleviate some of the burdens of disclosure. Part III discusses the
potential drawbacks of an alternative process to the traditional IPO.
Part IV explains Spotify’s reasons for choosing a direct listing rather
than an IPO and shows how this may be bad for investors in the
long term because more companies may circumvent the IPO
process and the protections it provides investors. Part V suggests
that a possible solution to this problem is to adjust the direct listing
rules to require more disclosures from foreign private issuers.
Finally, Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Before proceeding, readers must understand the general IPO
process, the process for direct listings, the foreign private issuer
classification and the practice of dual-listing or cross-listing, and
some details surrounding the Spotify direct listing.
A. The Traditional IPO Process and Its Requirements
The modern IPO process was established by the Securities Act
of 1933 (the Securities Act).32 The Securities Act provides
extensive—and expensive—requirements that must be met to offer
and sell securities to the general public.33 For U.S. IPOs between
January 1 and December 10, 2018, the combined legal, accounting,
and printing fees and underwriter compensation for technology
companies averaged over $18.8 million.34
To register shares under the Securities Act, an issuer must
prepare a prospectus to share with initial investors and a
registration statement to be filed with the SEC.35 In the registration
statement, generally prepared as required by Form S-1, issuers
32. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012).
33. Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation, supra note 18, at 225.
34. 2018 Technology and Life Sciences IPO Report, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,

https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/IPO-Report/YE2018/IPO-Report-YE2018.pdf.
35. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z (2012).

579

005.TANNER_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/14/20 1:51 PM

2019

must provide between two and five years’ worth of audited
historical financial information, including balance sheets,
statements of cash flow and income, select financial information, as
well as a discussion and analysis of the company from the
management and details about risks the company faces, operations,
major shareholders, and compensation of executives.36
To prepare these documents, issuers work closely with
attorneys, as well as investment banks—which are in turn
represented by their own attorneys. In an IPO, investment banks
operate as brokers, helping the issuer find large institutional
investors willing to purchase the shares.37 In this process, known as
bookbuilding, investment banks and issuers hope to build interest
and facilitate a strong IPO—that is, an IPO where there is great
demand for the offered shares. In addition to participating as
brokers, investment banks also underwrite the initial public
offerings, normally agreeing to a firm-commitment underwriting—
whereby they contract to purchase all of the offered shares,
regardless of their ability to sell the shares to the large institutional
investors when the registration becomes effective. Investment
banks make money on the spread between the price at which
they agree to purchase the shares in the underwriting and the price
at which they sell the shares to the institutional investors.38 They
also take a customary seven percent commission on the total
offering amount.39
Importantly, investment banks provide a valuable check on the
IPO process. They work with their customers—the group of
institutional investors—to determine an appropriate price for
which the shares will be sold. They also sometimes purchase more

36. Carlos Berdejo, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (2015); see Form
S-1
Registration
Statement
Under
the
Securities
Act
of
1933,
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2019); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.11 (2014). These disclosure requirements may be scaled back for companies that qualify
as Emerging Growth Companies under Section 2(a)(19) of the Securities Act. See Emerging
Growth Companies, SEC https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC.
37. Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation, supra note 18, at 225.
38. See id. at 227–32.
39. Tom Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing Consideration Invites Risk, LAW360 (Apr. 14, 2017,
9:45 AM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/913168/spotify-s-directlisting-consideration-invites-risk- [hereinafter Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing] (noting that
underwriters’ fees are typically seven percent of offering proceeds, “though large companies
have more negotiating power”).
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shares to stabilize the price.40 Additionally, if underwriters do not
see enough potential in IPOs, they may not agree to a firmcommitment underwriting. Rather, they will agree to a “best
efforts” underwriting. Under this approach, they are not required
to purchase any shares that are not allocated to institutional
investors.41 Under some best efforts agreements, if a threshold of
shares is not allocated to institutional investors, any purchased
allocation will be refunded, and the issuer will not go through with
the IPO.42
In addition to mandating disclosures, the Securities Act also
restricts issuers from communicating about the upcoming
offering.43 The Securities Act defines the communications,
including, for example, broad definitions for what constitutes an
offer: “‘offer to sale’, ‘offer for sale’, and ‘offer’ shall include every
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a
security.”44 Section 5 of the Securities Act provides a broad
restriction against the sale or offer of securities without an effective
registration statement,45 and the gun-jumping rules lay out a
complex set of regulations restricting the type of communications a
company can make during an imposed “quiet period” depending
on whether the registration statement has been filed or has become
effective.46 Failure to observe the gun-jumping rules can be costly,
as issuers or other participants in the offering, like underwriters,
may be liable for substantial damages under Section 12 of the
Securities Act.47
Later, once securities are registered under the Securities Act,
they can be sold to public investors, but the issuer is responsible for
mandatory ongoing disclosures, including the filing of annual

40. Tom Zanki, Spotify Opens Door to Direct Listings Among Tech Unicorns, LAW360
(Apr. 3, 2018, 10:20 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/1029200
/spotify-opens-door-to-direct-listings-among-tech-unicorns [hereinafter Zanki, Spotify
Opens Door].
41. Brianne M. Hess, Google Inc.: The Dutch Auction Approach as an Alternative to FirmCommitment Underwriting, 7 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 89, 91–92 (2005).
42. Id.
43. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012).
44. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012).
45. Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
46. See, e.g., Securities Act Rules 134, 164, and 433; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134, 230.164, &
230.433 (2014).
47. Securities Act § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2012).
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reports in compliance with Form 10-K, quarterly disclosures in
compliance with Form 10-Q, and current reports in accordance
with Form 8-K.48 Investors retain near-strict liability for any
material misstatements or omissions in the effective registration
statement under Section 11 of the Securities Act.49
B. The Direct Listing Process and Its Requirements
In contrast to IPOs, direct listings require no involvement from
an underwriter, and companies initiating a direct listing are not
subject to the same gun-jumping rules.50 Instead, in a direct listing,
a company registers only its existing shares. Direct listings have
many of the same benefits as IPOs, including providing liquidity to
initial investors and employees, allowing robust mergers and
acquisitions through the use of equity as all or part of the purchase
price, advertising and brand awareness, and validating the
credibility of the company.51 The main difference is that no new
shares are issued, so no capital is raised. Of course, that difference
is significant. “Raising capital is historically considered the main
reason for conducting an IPO.”52
Despite that history, a direct listing comes with its own benefits
for the existing stockholders and the issuer. 53 An investment bank
is not needed to underwrite the shares, so no seven percent
commission is exacted for their services.54 Existing shareholders
aren’t diluted by the issuance of new shares.55
Additionally, in most IPOs, shareholders who hold shares prior
to the IPO, like venture capitalists or employees, cannot sell their
shares at the time of the IPO.56 Rather, they agree to a “lock-up”
period, normally the first 180 days the stock is publicly traded,

48. 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308, 249.308a, 249.310 (2014); Berdejo, supra note 36, at 14.
49. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
50. Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, § 10:107 Direct Listings, in GOING PUBLIC
AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION

(2018).

51. See Zolnierz, supra note 7, at 66–69.
52. See Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40 (noting that today many companies

can obtain the capital they need through private investors).
53. Erin Griffith, How Will Spotify’s Direct Listing Work?, FORTUNE (Jul. 31, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/07/31/spotify-ipo-direct-listing-2/.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711,
719–20 (2005).
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during which they are restricted from trading.57 A lock-up protects
against insiders immediately flooding the market with supply and
lowering the value of the shares.58 Instead, investment banks and
the issuer want to manage the supply to encourage a dramatic spike
in the share price—particularly on the first day of trading.59 For the
issuer, a healthy spike on the first day of trading is a positive signal
to media, public investors, and analysts.60 For the underwriters, the
first day spike is simply customary arbitrage.61 The investment
banks, working in tandem with other industry insiders, “extract
wealth from the investing public” by buying the stock at a discount
before then selling it at a price that reflects the pent-up demand
created by the analysts and banks generating interest in the offering
and the controlled-for-supply—also a mechanism of the
underwriters’ lock-up requirement.62 With a direct listing, investors
and employees agree to no such lock-up.
Of course, a company performing a direct listing still faces some
requirements. First, a company that chooses a direct listing is not
immune from disclosure requirements. Section 12(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) provides,
“[a] security may be registered on a national securities exchange by
the issuer filing an application with the exchange” that contains
information necessary or appropriate to protect investors, as
determined by the SEC.63 To guide the SEC, Section 12 further
enumerates several types of information that may be appropriate,

57. Id.; see also Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40 (acknowledging six months as
the customary lock-up period).
58. See Hurt, supra note 56, at 755.
59. See id. at 719–20, 725, 733–34 (explaining that an investment bank will basically
manipulate the price of shares sold in the IPO by “pre-allocating most of the original shares
and controlling the resale of those shares” to restrict founders and venture capitalists from
selling shares to avoid a drop in the stock price).
60. Henry Blodget, Everyone Who Thinks IPO “Pops” Are Good Has Been Brainwashed,
BUSINESS INSIDER (May 26, 2012, 11:41 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ipo-pops2012-5 (explaining that despite the fact that a spike in the first-day trading price
actually means the issuer left money on the table, many people, including the media,
view a first day “pop” as a positive sign, and Facebook’s pop of only ten percent was seen
as a disappointment).
61. See Hurt, supra note 56, at 717, 719–20, 722 (explaining that IPO pricing is a
“concerted effort” of the banks and private investors, friends, family, and other insiders to
whom the issuers will agree to sell shares before the IPO who will recognize a profit when
they subsequently sell the acquired shares on the first day).
62. Id.
63. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2012).
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including “the organization, financial structures, and nature of the
business,” the rights and terms of any outstanding classes of
securities, the terms of any prior public or private offerings, a list of
shareholders owning ten percent or more of any class of security, a
list of directors and officers and their compensation, material
contracts not made in the ordinary course of business, and the
balance sheets and income statements for the prior three years.64
Section 12 also suggests that companies should disclose voting
agreements and underwriting agreements, and should provide
copies of bylaws, material contracts, and articles of incorporation.65
Thus, just as Section 12 applies to companies registering shares
on an exchange via IPO, it also regulates direct listings. To comply
with Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, companies still have to file
disclosures in compliance with Form 10, or Form 20-F for foreign
companies, which requires many of the same disclosures as a
registration statement requires for an IPO.66 However, there are
some differences.
One difference is that management and advisers are allowed to
speak publicly about the listing since SEC-mandated quiet-period
restrictions—the gun-jumping rules—only prevent them from
promoting an offering, and a direct listing is not an offering because
no new shares are issued.67 Of course, the issuer must still avoid
triggering liability under Section 11 for material misstatements or
omissions.68 But the freedom of executives to discuss the upcoming
offering without penalty of gun-jumping is a noticeable benefit as
it allows them to generate buzz and excitement around the
upcoming listing and, potentially, create demand that will pump
up the stock price.
Direct listings traditionally occur under limited circumstances,
such as following a spinoff or after companies exit bankruptcy.69
They have previously been used only rarely, usually by small-cap

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

§ 12(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2012).
§ 12(b)(2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2012).
Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 50.
Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing, supra note 39.
Ze’-ev D. Eiger & Brian D. Hirschberg, Foreign Issuers Filing a Form 20-F,
Morrison & Foerster (Mar. 3, 2016) at 75, https://media2.mofo.com/documents/
160303foreignissuersform20f.pdf.
69. Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40.
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companies in the biotech and life science industries70 with little
trading volume.71 Since 2006, Nasdaq has completed only six direct
listings, and until Spotify, the NYSE had not completed any.72
Additionally, a small company exiting bankruptcy provides little
precedent for a large private company like Spotify completing
the process.73
C. The Foreign Private Issuer Classification and the Practice of Dual- or
Cross-Listing
Many companies that conduct direct offerings are international
companies. International companies can enjoy some unique
benefits when listing securities on a U.S. exchange, particularly if
they qualify as “foreign private issuers.” In addition, international
companies anticipate that by listing their shares on a U.S. exchange,
as well as a local exchange, investors will value the securities
higher.74 This practice of listing shares on multiple exchanges is
referred to as cross-listing or dual-listing.75
1. Foreign private issuer classification
Naturally, legislators, exchanges, bankers, and the SEC are very
interested in encouraging many companies to list on U.S.
exchanges, and that extends to foreign companies as well. An
increase in the number of publicly listed companies can contribute
to investor confidence in the public markets. To stimulate this

70. Griffith, supra note 53.
71. Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40.
72. Alexander Osipovich & Maureen Farrell, ‘Spotify Rule’ Would Help New York Stock

Exchange Woo Unicorns, WALL STREET J. (May 26, 2017, 8:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/spotify-rule-would-help-new-york-stock-exchange-woo-unicorns-1495791000. In
the past, the NYSE rules only allowed direct listings on its exchange on a case-by-case
approach. See Brady et al., supra note 2 . In February the NYSE updated its rules to allow
Spotify—and hopefully more companies—to list hassle-free without actually issuing new
shares for sale. See also Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3 and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 3, to Amend Section 102.01B of
the NYSE Listed Company Manual, U.S. SEC (Feb. 2, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov
/rules/sro/nyse/2018/34-82627.pdf.
73. Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing, supra note 39.
74. See Zonierz, supra note 7, at 65.
75. See id. (Dual-listing may refer specifically to a company listing shares on its home
country exchange and a U.S. exchange at the same time, but in this article they are used
interchangeably.); Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or
Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 141–45 (2003).
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increase, legislators have sought to provide international
companies with a relatively less intensive mechanism—as
compared to the normal registration process—for listing on U.S.
exchanges. Under current securities laws, corporations that qualify
as foreign private issuers face relaxed disclosure requirements. As
Spotify noted in its registration statement risk factors, “[a]s a
foreign private issuer, we are exempt from a number of U.S.
securities laws and rules promulgated thereunder and are
permitted to publicly disclose less information than U.S. companies
must. This may limit the information available to holders of the
ordinary shares.”76
First, readers must understand the classification. A foreign
private issuer can be any company except those for which U.S.
residents are holders of record, directly or indirectly, of no more
than 50% of outstanding voting securities, and the issuer does
not (1) have a majority of executives or directors who are U.S.
citizens or residents, (2) have more than 50% of its assets in the U.S.,
or (3) administer its business principally in the U.S.77 If more than
50% of the shares are held by a U.S. resident and one of the
three other conditions is met, the company will be treated as a
domestic issuer.78
According to one legal researcher, the difference between
disclosures for domestic companies and those that qualify as
foreign private issuers is significant.79 “The United States
effectively has two securities regulation regimes: one for domestic
issuers and another for foreign issuers. The latter ‘cuts corners’ on
key issues of corporate governance.”80
A foreign private issuer is required to submit a registration
statement in accordance with Form F-1, rather than Form S-1.
Disclosures for the F-1 are not significantly different than those
required for an S-1. The significant changes come before and after
the registration statement.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018).
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2008).
Id.
Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Private
Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1652 (2010).
80. Id.
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A foreign private issuer is required to submit annual reports in
accordance with Form 20-F rather than, as domestic issuers, filing
interim disclosures via Form 10-Q and annual disclosures as
proscribed by Form 10-K. As one reporter noted, “after a public
listing, a unicorn would have to issue quarterly reports and become
subject to the pressures of Wall Street. But the company can
minimise the impact of these pressures by listing less than 20 per
cent of its shares for public trading.”81 The requirement to issue
quarterly reports does not apply to foreign private issuers, though,
even if they list more than twenty percent of their shares. “[F]oreign
private issuers are required to furnish as interim reports only
whatever information the foreign private issuer has made or is
required to make public pursuant to its home country’s corporate
laws or a non-U.S. stock exchange’s requirements.”82 Some, like
Spotify, explain in their F-1 that they intend to provide quarterly
reports—without elaborating upon how quickly they will file the
reports or whether they will include all the same information as
required in a 10-Q—but they are not forced to do so.83 What’s more,
in Spotify’s case, the company did not explain what it would
include in the quarterly filings.84 Instead, whenever foreign private
issuers file periodic disclosures or make periodic disclosures to
local security holders, they are required to also file such disclosures
on Form 6-K. This rule captures the assumption that foreign private
issuers will be required, under local rules, to file periodic
disclosures, and that U.S. investors will thus be provided with
frequent disclosures. However, no remedy is provided for
disclosures in the case that a foreign private issuer is not listed in
its home country and therefore does not have even a local
obligation to provide regular updates. As a foreign private issuer
not subject to interim disclosures under local listing laws, Spotify

81. Pozen, supra note 8.
82. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1653; see Nicolas Grabar et al., A Look Under the Hood of

Spotify’s Direct Listing, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation (Apr. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/a-look-underthe-hood-of-spotifys-direct-listing/ (“Since Spotify is not a reporting company elsewhere, it
will have latitude to decide for itself what and how often to file.”).
83. Grabar, supra note 82.
84. Id.
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could decide independently the frequency and content of its eventdriven disclosures.85
In addition to relaxed 20-F and 6-K disclosures, foreign private
issuers are not subject to some conflicts of interest requirements.86
For example, they do not have to disclose data regarding material
transactions with affiliates like officers, directors, or control
persons.87 These issuers can also avoid several duties in connection
with proxy statements required under Section 14 of the Exchange
Act.88 Issuers are also exempted from Section 16 of the Exchange
Act, which prohibits short sales and short-swing profits by
corporate insiders,89 meaning that corporate insiders can sell
without any requirement that the Company promptly disclose the
sale.90 Such an exemption allows more room to trade on
inside information.91
2. The practice of cross-listing
Cross-listing is a common practice among both U.S. firms and
international firms.92 Cross-listing is simply the practice of
registering securities on an exchange in Country A and then listing
a replica or derivative of those securities on an exchange in Country
B.93 Most often, shares are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges as
American depository receipts (ADRs)—U.S. bank-issued
certificates that are placeholders for “a certain number of foreign
shares on deposit with the bank or a custodian bank in the foreign
country.”94 ADRs are appealing because they are listed in U.S.
dollars, currency is converted by the bank at favorable rates,
clearance and settlement practices adhere to U.S. laws, certificates
can be exchanged for the foreign shares they represent at any time,

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Licht, supra note 75, at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Grabar, supra note 82.
Id.
Zolnierz, supra note 7.
See Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in
International Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 55 (2000).
94. Id. at 58.
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and, for so-called “sponsored” ADRs that are registered by the
issuer, routine disclosures must be provided.95
In conjunction with the increasing numbers of foreign
companies listed on U.S. exchanges, many people have become
increasingly interested in cross-listing since the mid-1980s.96
According to a report by Ernst & Young, seven percent of 2017 IPOs
were cross-listed, up from six percent in 2016, but still down from
ten percent in 2014.97 A total of 118 cross-border IPOs were
completed in 2017.98 Eight percent of all issuers based in Europe,
the Middle East, India, and Africa cross-listed.99 Ten Europe-based
companies listed on a U.S. exchange (about twenty-five percent of
global inbound cross-listings), representing a total of $1.8 billion in
IPO activity.100
Primarily, companies cross-list for financial reasons.101 By crosslisting, some companies listed on foreign market exchanges can
reduce their cost to capital because investors are willing to pay
more for stock if they know more about it.102 That is, they do not
have to price in the weak disclosures or limited institutional
structure the company faces on its home exchange.103 On the other
hand, “companies that [are] already high-disclosing or from highdisclosing countries” can enjoy premiums on the U.S. market
because they are de-risked for investors through the disclosures
they are already required to make on a home exchange.104 Lastly,
“[c]ompanies may also list on foreign stock exchanges for standard
business reasons such as marketing of products and improving
their visibility.”105

95. Id. at 58–59.
96. See Licht, supra note 75, at 143; see also Licht, supra note 93, at 55.
97. GLOBAL IPO TRENDS: Q4 2017, ERNST & YOUNG 5 (2017), http://www.ey.com

/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-ipo-trends-q4-2017/$FILE/ey-global-ipo-trends-q42017.pdf.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id. at 10.
101. Licht, supra note 93, at 54.
102. Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude Is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the
United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369, 405 (2008).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Licht, supra note 93, at 54.
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To be clear, cross-listing via the process of direct listing is
routine, especially among European companies.106 Many
companies do not conduct a public offering as part of the crosslisting process. Others choose to list the shares on both a local
exchange and a U.S. exchange concurrently in a public offering.107
D. The Spotify Direct Listing
Unlike traditional direct listings often used as a mechanism for
cross-listing, Spotify’s direct listing on the NYSE was not simply a
tool for cross-listing. Spotify’s securities are not traded on any
exchange besides the NYSE. Many companies registering their
shares do so as part of an IPO and offer the primary shares for sale
to investors to raise capital. Spotify’s direct listing was different.
In the F-1, the company explained, “[u]nlike an initial public
offering, the resale by the Registered Shareholders is not being
underwritten by any investment bank. The Registered
Shareholders may, or may not, elect to sell their ordinary shares
covered by this prospectus, as and to the extent they may
determine.”108 Resales were of “ordinary shares”109 listed at U.S.
prices, not ADRs used by cross-listed companies. Unlike the
regular bookbuilding process conducted by investment banks that
secure purchases of share allocations by specific institutional
investors, Spotify’s direct listing allowed everyday people to invest
immediately.110 As Spotify CEO Daniel Ek put it, “‘[w]e don’t
believe in gatekeepers,’” (assumedly referring to the broker role
typically played by investment banks) and the company touted
the method as more transparent and “accessible to a wider array
of investors.”111
Additionally, Spotify qualified as a foreign private issuer. By
qualifying as a foreign private issuer, the company accesses more
lenient disclosure requirements. Though its F-1 was essentially as
detailed as an S-1, the company is not forced into the same ongoing
quarterly disclosure regime that domestic corporations face, and

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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Id. at 58.
Zolnierz, supra note 7, at 65.
Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018).
Id.
Zanki, supra note 4.
Zanki, supra note 4.
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the company is required to provide non-annual ongoing updates
only in accordance with corporate laws of Sweden. As noted above,
the company in its F-1 noted its intention to provide quarterly
disclosures. Spotify likely committed to provide interim reports
because, again, companies are often able to obtain better market
prices in return for meaningful disclosures.112
Since the direct listing, Spotify has provided interim disclosures
every three months, and these disclosures have been structured
much the same as interim reports on Form 10-Q made by other
companies, with consolidated financial metrics, discussion and
analysis of financial conditions by management, and risk factors.113
But as a foreign private issuer, U.S. securities laws do not mandate
these filings, and Spotify is not required to make these interim
disclosures under the corporate laws of Sweden.114
Many analysts, attorneys, and investors predicted the market
price for Spotify’s shares would be volatile without the regular
underwriter price-setting and supply-and-demand smoothing.115
Despite these concerns, the market price of the shares has been
relatively stable during the first weeks of trading.116 The process has
prompted speculation that other firms may follow suit, which
could significantly affect the IPO landscape, the types of companies
that become publicly traded, and the investment banks that assist
corporations in the IPO process. These changes may detract from
the purposes of the regular IPO process.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE IPO PROCESS
AND ATTEMPTS TO ALLEVIATE ITS BURDENS
The modern IPO process has developed over many years since
the Securities Act. The Act provides a path to registration and

112. See Licht, supra note 75, at 144.
113. See Spotify Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or

15d-16 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (May 3, 2018); Spotify Tech.
S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (July 26, 2018); Spotify Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private
Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6K) (November 1, 2018).
114. Aitken, supra note 1; see also Grabar, supra note 82.
115. See Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40 (explaining that capital markets experts
feared the unconventional process “would leave it vulnerable to sharp volatility”).
116. See Levine, supra note 15.
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public offering, but the path is difficult to traverse and full of
restrictions and potential liabilities. As private capital has become
more accessible and made some benefits of an IPO less enticing, the
number of IPOs has slowed. Legislators recognized the deterrent
effect of the restrictions and hoped to promote a stronger public
market by relaxing disclosure requirements for some companies. In
so doing, they sacrificed protections for investors in hopes that they
can trim away burdensome nonmaterial disclosures while
preserving those disclosures that investors will find material.117
A. The IPO Process and the Importance of Protecting Investors
As discussed above, the Securities Act regulates IPOs through
its gun-jumping rules and restrictions on offers and sales to the
public.118 The process has been warily crafted by the legislature to
prevent information asymmetries between investors by ensuring
that all investors receive material information regarding the offered
securities at the same time. The gun-jumping rules also prevent
companies from creating hype about the offered securities, which
would lead to an overpriced valuation for the shares.
For many companies, the IPO process takes about four months
from the time of filing a registration statement with the SEC until
the market debut when the shares are offered on an exchange.119
Leading up to the IPO, the issuer and its executives are effectively
precluded from discussing the IPO plans.120 Under the securities
laws, during the thirty days before the registration statement is

117. Dave Simpson, SEC Trims Company Disclosure Requirements, LAW360
(Mar.
20,
2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1141159/sec-trims-companydisclosure-requirements (noting the SEC’s approach of “easing burdens and providing more
flexibility to issuers while insisting that investors won’t be shortchanged access to
material information”).
118. See, e.g., Securities Act § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012); Securities Act Rules
134, 164, and 433, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134, 230.164, 230.433 (2014).
119. Tom Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing Thrust 1 Firm into April Spotlight, LAW360 (May
1, 2018, 8:23 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/1039088/spotify-sdirect-listing-thrust-1-firm-into-april-spotlight.
120. Susan B. Heyman, The Quiet Period in a Noisy World: Rethinking Securities Regulation
and Corporate Free Speech, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 189, 196–98 (2013) (explaining that, as explained
Infra, Part II.A, the securities laws regulate offers to sale and that offers is defined broadly,
precluding a large swath of communications); see Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(3) (2006).
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filed, issuers cannot offer to sell or sell the securities.121 Once the
registration statement is filed, issuers are allowed to offer the shares
vocally,122 which enables issuers to work with investment banks in
the bookbuilding process, part of which involves visiting
prospective investors across the country in what is known as a
roadshow to gauge interest in the offering and prepare an offering
price123. But even after the registration statement is filed, companies
are allowed to make written offers of the shares only using the
statutory prospectus.124 Any written communications prior to the
effective date, even emails or handwritten notes, must comply with
Section 10 preliminary prospectus requirements.125 Otherwise,
written or other broadcast communications, including video
recordings, might qualify as a free writing prospectus,126 but the
issuer will be liable for any misstatements or omissions in the free
writing prospectus.
During the waiting period—the time between when the
registration statement is filed with the SEC and when it is declared
effective—the SEC provides comment and feedback on the
registration statement.127 The SEC conducts a review of every IPO
registration statement,128 proceeds through the registration
statement line by line, and routinely requests, using a comment
letter, modifications or additional disclosures to the document.
Under Section 8(a) of the Securities Act, a registration statement
would become effective twenty days after the last filed registration
statement, regardless of whether the issuer has responded to the
SEC comments.129 In practice however, except for shelf
registrations, “no issuer allows its registration statement to become
121. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security . . . prior to the
effective date of the registration statement.”); see also Heyman, supra note 114, at 196.
122. See Heyman, supra note 120, at 196.
123. See Hurt, supra note 56, at 736–37 (explaining the roadshow process, which
involves pitching groups of potential investors and responding to questions).
124. See Heyman, supra note 120, at 196.
125. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS
424 (4th ed. 2015).
126. Id. at 428–29.
127. Id. at 436–37.
128. Id. at 437.
129. Id. at 435.
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effective automatically . . . . Instead, issuers commonly file a
registration statement with a Rule 473 notation [also known as a
delaying amendment], which automatically amends the
registration statement until the SEC has declared it effective.”130
Similarly, in a direct listing, a filed registration statement could
become effective automatically thirty days after filing, regardless
of whether the SEC approved the registration statement. Sticking
with the common practice of domestic issuers conducting an
offering, however, Spotify waited until the SEC declared the
registration statement effective nearly three months after the initial
confidential filing.131
Despite the precedent of IPO candidates waiting until the SEC
approves the registration statement before declaring it effective,
companies, including those conducting a direct listing, could allow
the statement to become effective without SEC approval.132 In fact,
during the government shutdown beginning December 22, 2018,
which lasted a record thirty-four days,133 during which the SEC
eventually stopped reviewing registration statements, Gossamer
Bio, Inc., a company preparing for an IPO, actually removed the
delaying amendment from its amended registration statement in
what may have been the first IPO not to include the delaying
amendment.134 In that case, the company disclosed that its
registration statement would become effective within twenty days,
a risky action considering there could be no further changes
without resetting the twenty-day clock, including changes to the
offering price.135 In the end, only a couple days after Gossamer Bio
filed the amended registration statement with the delaying
amendment removed, the shutdown ended and the SEC renewed
130. Id.
131. Grabar, supra note 82 (explaining that because “Spotify is not a reporting company

elsewhere, it will have latitude to decide for itself what and how often to file”).
132. There are several risks a company would face if it moved forward without a
delaying amendment, including the threat that the SEC would issue a stop order, suspending
the effectiveness of the registration statement. See Choi, supra note 125, at 435-36.
133. Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was the
Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html.
134. See Gossamer Bio, Inc., Form S-1/A, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar /data
/1728117/000119312519014857/d690055ds1a.htm; see also Liz Dunshee, First IPO Without a
Delaying Amendment?, BROC’S BLOG, (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www. thecorporatecounsel.net
/blog/2019/01/first-ipo-without-delaying-amendment.html.
135. See Choi, supra note 125, at 436.
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its review of registration statements.136 The company promptly
filed an amended registration statement including the delaying
amendment.137 Though the company did not proceed with making
its registration statement automatically effective under Section 8(a),
its action called into question the longstanding tradition of
including the delaying amendment. Likewise, Spotify’s direct
listing called into question the longstanding IPO tradition more
generally. As explained, the traditional IPO process is intensive,
and more companies, by necessity—as in the case of Gossamer Bio,
Inc.—or by choice—as with Spotify—are beginning to question it.138
Of course, Congress and the SEC made the IPO process arduous
intentionally. The whole purpose of the registration system is “to
protect investors and ensure confidence in the integrity of the
public capital markets.”139 The Securities Act was intended
primarily as a protection for investors as a response to the vagaries
of the trusts and the fraud that prevailed prior to the legislation.140
Since then, securities regulators and the federal courts have tried to
balance the need for protection with the other purposes of the
statute. Some efforts have been more effective than others. Most
often, additional securities laws and required disclosures have been
enacted as a response to perceived or actual improper activities and
inadequate disclosures, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
followed the disturbing accounting practices surrounding the
collapse of Enron.141 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act was meant to
prevent a recurrence of the over-extension that led to the financial
crisis of 2007–08.142 On the other hand, restrictions and regulations

136. John Jenkins, Corp Fin’s Post-Shutdown Plan: “First Come, First Served”,
BROC’S BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2019/01/corpfins-post-shutdown-plan-first-come-first-served.html.
137. Dunshee, supra note 134.
138. See Levine, supra note 18 (prosing that Slack’s embrace of the direct listing
approach after Spotify’s example will open the door to more companies questioning the
typical IPO path, instead exploring options that better suit their individualized needs); see
also Cydney Posner, IPO Mix and Match, COOLEY PUBCO (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://cooleypubco.com/2019/01/15/ipo-mix-and-match/.
139. Berdejo, supra note 36, at 17.
140. See generally Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common
Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2139–44 (1995).
141. See generally Byron F. Egan, Major Themes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 42-WTR TEX. J.
BUS. L. 339 (2008).
142. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011).
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have been pulled back or exceptions have been created when
legislators become convinced the disclosure and regulation is
stifling economic progress and determine that these costs outweigh
the benefits of investor protection.
B. Attempts to Alleviate the Burdens of the IPO Process
After the strong IPO market of the 1990s and early 2000s,
policymakers became alarmed when the IPO market slowed down
and determined that changes to the disclosure requirements and
gun jumping were necessary to restore confidence in the
public market.
Thus, in 2012 Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act143 as a direct response to this concern. The JOBS
Act created a category called Emerging Growth Company (EGC)
for companies with less than $1 billion in annual gross revenues,144
among other requirements, and adjusted IPO rules for those EGCs.
Among many adjustments, EGCs enjoy relaxed disclosure
requirements, including that they only have to provide two years
of audited financial data rather than three years’ worth, in most
cases.145 They can also avoid disclosures regarding executive
compensation mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.146
As well as trimming disclosures, the JOBS Act changed gunjumping rules, allowing companies to confidentially file a draft
registration statement with the SEC, which gives the company
an opportunity to receive confidential feedback from the SEC and
gauge the difficulty in meeting SEC approval.147 EGCs can also “test
the market” by communicating, orally or through written
material, with Qualified Institutional Buyers and institutional
Accredited Investors “before or after the initial filing of a
registration statement.”148
The JOBS Act and its creation of the EGC category and the
special registration rules EGCs enjoy—not to mention the recent

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
§ 101.
§ 102(b)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 309 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (2012)).
See § 102.
See Securities Act Rule 433(h)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(h)(4) (2014).
Berdejo, supra note 36, at 26; see also Securities Act Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a)(1)–(6) (2014); JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 105, 126 Stat. 306, 310–11 (2012).
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expansion by the SEC of the confidential filing rule to virtually all
private companies, regardless of whether they have more than $1
billion in annual gross revenue149—is clear evidence of the efforts
of Congress and regulators to encourage more IPOs in what has
been a sluggish IPO market.150 It is also a continuous move away
from investor protection.
Other requirements have been relaxed, both as part of the JOBS
Act and as subsequent legislation and rulemaking, in an effort to
ease the burdens of companies going and staying public. In
addition to special rules for EGCs, the JOBS Act (1) increased the
avenues to obtaining financing from investors through the
increase of Regulation A+ fundraising limits (moving the cap from
$5 million to $50 million151), (2) allowed issuers to solicit more
broadly, and (3) incorporated the CROWDFUND Act, which
attempted to expand the ability of companies to disintermediate
fundraising and solicit broad investor audiences across the
internet.152 More recently, the Senate passed a bill that would relax
some of the regulations the banking industry faces under the DoddFrank Act.153
Unfortunately, the JOBS Act, in particular, was not as helpful as
policymakers hoped in encouraging more IPOs, at least in the short
term. Many companies—between seventy to eighty percent of all
IPO companies154—have filed confidential registration statements,
but only 98 IPOs were conducted on U.S. exchanges in 2016, down

149. Press Release, Draft Registration Statement Processing Procedures Expanded,
SEC (June 29, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/announcement/draftregistration-statement-processing-procedures-expanded.
150. See Erik P.M. Vermeulen, High-Tech Companies and the Decision to “Go Public”: Are
Backdoor Listings (Still) an Alternative to “Front-Door” Initial Public Offerings?, 4 PA. ST. J. L. &
INT’L AFF. 421, 421, 424 (2015) (expanding on alternatives to IPOs, particularly reverse
mergers or reverse takeovers, commenting on the “sluggish IPO markets” and “costly and
lengthy regulatory barriers,” and explaining the efforts of policymakers and regulators to
“stimulate IPO activity by high-tech companies” through the legislation like the JOBS Act).
151. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(2), 230.257(b)(3) (2015).
152. See CROWDFUND Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–305, 126 Stat. 306, 315–23
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Hurt, supra note 18,
at 227–32.
153. Alan Rappeport, Senate Passes Bill Loosening Banking Rules, but Hurdles Remain in
the House, N. Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2018, at A18.
154. Vermeulen, supra note 150, at 442.
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from 244 in 2014.155 The year 2017 was an improvement, but still
there were only 174 IPOs.156 In 2018, the U.S. IPO market saw
continued increase, with 205 offerings,157 and 2019 is expected to be
a banner year, if not in the number of offerings, at least in size158.
Still, if the changes to the IPO process are helping, it has not been
obvious. The expected increase in IPO activity is fueled, at least in
large part, by strong performance of IPO stocks in 2018.159 Many of
the companies expected to conduct an IPO in 2019 have been able
to delay the process much longer than companies historically
delayed, “opting to stick with private captial.”160 Not surprisingly,
lawmakers and investors seem as desperate as ever to encourage
the growing number of unicorns and “decacorns”161 to transition
into the public market, which is part of the reason all eyes have been
on Spotify, and why policymakers seem more willing than ever to
continue making tradeoffs and adjustments to encourage
companies to migrate to the public markets—whether by IPO or
some other method.
IV. THE DRAWBACKS OF DIRECT LISTING AS AN IPO ALTERNATIVE
Despite these efforts to facilitate the movement of private
companies to the public markets, the embrace of direct listings as
an alternative to an IPO raises some concerns. Thus far, the Spotify
direct listing is viewed as a success. Nevertheless, although one
155. Lia Der Marderosian, et. al, 2017 IPO Report, Harvard L. Sch. Forum on
Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (May 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2017/05/25/2017-ipo-report/.
156. Global IPO Trends: Q4 2017, supra note 97, at 10.
157. Global IPO Trends: Q4 2018, ERNST & YOUNG 8, HTTPS://WWW.EY.COM
/PUBLICATION/VWLUASSETS/EY-GLOBAL-IPO-TRENDS-REPORT-Q4-2018/$FILE/EY-GLOBALIPO-TRENDS-REPORT-Q4-2018.PDF.
158. Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their
Moment in 2019, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungryinvestors-look-to-have-their-moment-in-201911546189200?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=6.
159. Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their
Moment in 2019, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungryinvestors-look-to-have-their-moment-in-201911546189200?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=6.
160. Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their
Moment in 2019, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungryinvestors-look-to-have-their-moment-in-201911546189200?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=6.
161. A decacorn is a startup valued over $10 billion. Fan, supra note 3, at 584.
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company successfully deviated from the typical IPO path to the
public markets and investors do not seem harmed, other companies
that follow the pattern may perform poorly and, in the case of more
foreign private issuers, choose to withhold more information from
their disclosures which will harm investors. As explained above,
the IPO process and the scrutiny it requires are meant to protect
investors. Even parts of the process that are not mandated—like
working with an underwriter—serve as important checks on the
quality of companies that offer shares to the public. The direct
listing process increases investor risk because (1) issuers are not
required to provide as many disclosures, (2) issuers are not subject
to stringent gun jumping rules, and (3) investors are not as well
protected against volatility as they are when an underwriter is
involved who has guided the company through the bookbuilding
process to determine an appropriate price and highlight any issues
regarding investor confidence that should be addressed or
disclosed before the offering.
First, disclosure requirements are critical to investor protection.
Current rules for foreign private issuers do not adequately address
the unique circumstances of a direct listing like that conducted by
Spotify. When a foreign private issuer is not listing on any exchange
that requires quarterly and annual disclosures, investors could be
left without enough protection, particularly when the company is a
high-profile consumer product or brand like Spotify. Without
mandated, ongoing disclosures, companies like these could
essentially present an all-is-well facade to investors and reporters.
The market price may not reflect the true value of the company if
there is negative information that would normally be revealed in
mandated disclosures, but is not revealed under the special rules
for a direct listing by a foreign private issuer.
Of course, investors will sometimes be better protected if shares
are listed on a U.S. exchange by foreign private issuers than if the
investors purchased shares listed only on a foreign exchange
because the company cross-listing shares will be subject to U.S.
securities laws.162 U.S. securities laws, even under relaxed rules for
foreign private issuers, are more stringent than the securities—or

162. See Christopher Hung Nie Woo, United States Securities Regulation and Foreign
Private Issuers: Lessons from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 121 (2011).
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comparable—laws of some other countries.163 Additionally, some
writers have suggested that if a company does not provide
adequate disclosures, investors will take that into account
and discount the shares.164 However, without adequate disclosures,
particularly if the shares are not cross-listed, there’s little way to
know if the share price on the U.S. exchange appropriately
discounts the value of the shares. Quite simply, without
mandated disclosures, investors may not know enough to make
informed decisions.
Second, gun-jumping rules (sometimes referred to as quietperiod rules) are also meant to protect investors by encouraging
appropriate disclosure to all public investors at the appropriate
time.165 Though gun-jumping rules increase the IPO timeline, gunjumping rules are intended to provide public investors with all
relevant information by regulating not only the company directly
but also indirectly the analysts and reports and even journalists, in
some cases, by requiring that the company essentially police these
other players, in turn, and provide in a public filing accessible by
all investors any related communication leading up to the offering.
Gun-jumping rules allow the SEC time to carefully review
registration statements without the interference of the company
making public comments about the offering, potentially artificially
inflating the IPO stock price by fueling the interest generated by the
media and analysts disseminating more “glossy” materials, or
materials that would paint an unregulated, more positive review of
the company.166
IPOs get a lot of attention, which provides investors more
information, even though IPOs are usually bad long-term
investments.167 Reporters and analysts write a lot about upcoming
IPOs, and IPOs generate plenty of hype even when issuers follow
gun-jumping rules. The gun-jumping rules hold issuers responsible

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Brown, supra note 102.
Heyman, supra note 120, at 193.
Id.
See Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 56, at 715-16 (explaining that the insiders who
buy shares in the initial IPO are normally the most successful as “the average IPO share price
will decrease over the first three years”); see also Coryanne Hicks, IPOs Often Are More Hype
Than Substance, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing101/articles/2017-10-31/ipos-often-are-more-hype-than-substance.
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even for journalist publications if the issuer becomes aware of the
report and fails to file it with the SEC within four days.168 But with
a direct listing, executives do not have to comply with gun jumping
rules, and they are free to discuss the upcoming listing. Again, the
gun-jumping rules intentionally stifle executive communications
leading up to an IPO in an effort to prevent over-pricing and market
manipulation. If direct listings become a common alternative to
IPOs, gun-jumping rules cannot protect investors.
The risk of trading newly public securities has been regulated
very carefully in the past. Issuers that have not previously
registered securities (non-reporting issuers) were traditionally
regulated most carefully—as compared to a so-called seasoned
issuer or “Well-Known Seasoned Issuer” (WKSI)—because
investors face enormous information asymmetries when a
company that has never provided public disclosure does so, and in
close proximity to then offering those shares for sale to the public.169
Though the SEC is concerned about protecting investors and
potential investors in all companies, including seasoned issuers
and WKSIs, seasoned issuers and WKSIs face less stringent rules
about communicating because the companies have been filing
ongoing disclosures for extended periods of time.170 The stricter
rules for offerings by non-reporting issuers illustrate the concerns
specific to protecting investors at the time of the IPO.171 Of course,
the JOBS Act introduced special exemptions to gun jumping rules
for EGCs, clearly moving away from investor protection. A trend
toward direct listings as a replacement for IPOs, rather than their
current use most often as a complement to IPOs, would further
exacerbate the risks investors face when a company’s stock is first
traded publicly. Gun-jumping rules would do little to protect
investors then.
Third, circumventing underwriters may be cost-effective for the
issuer, but everyday investors benefit from the expertise and
validity that investment banks bring to the IPO process. The
benefits include lockup protections, support of long-term investors,

168.
169.
170.
171.

See Securities Act Rule 433(f), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (2014).
Heyman, supra note 120, at 199–202.
Id.
Id.
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protection against volatility, price discovery, and added legal
review.172 As one legal writer noted,
[t]he potential for volatility was a big concern with Spotify since
it was departing from the traditional initial public offering path,
which typically includes a ‘lockup period’ negotiated with
underwriters that withholds most shares from being traded right
after the IPO. Lockups are intended to limit the potential for
unpredictable trading in the first few months after a company’s
public debut, but most of Spotify’s shares immediately entered
public markets free of those restrictions.173

Had the CEO or other executives wanted, they could have
inundated the market with shares right at the start, before a price
had stabilized.
In contrast, investment banks can choose from their
customers—mostly institutional investors—to allocate shares to
investors that have a track record of holding the securities after an
IPO as long-term investments.174 As discussed above, underwriters
carefully assist with setting a price and shopping the securities to
investors during the weeks leading up to the IPO and monitor the
performance of the security in the minutes, hours, and days
following an IPO.175 They can also protect investors from volatility
by purchasing additional shares to keep the market price steady.176
Including underwriters in the registration process adds a layer of
protection to investors because not only will the issuer obtain legal
counsel, but the underwriter also obtains its own counsel to oversee
the process and flag any concerns.177
Despite the potential harms of a migration away from IPOs and
toward direct listings only, Spotify moved forward eagerly. The
company limited the breadth of disclosures it was required to
provide, avoided the frustrations of the gun-jumping rules, and
bypassed the expensive underwriting fees.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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V. SPOTIFY’S CHOICE FOR DIRECT LISTING
AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT
Though Spotify could have registered its shares on its home
country exchange and then cross-listed the shares in the United
States, it chose a direct listing. But by refusing to cross-list on its
own Stockholm stock exchange, Spotify made an unusual move.
“The vast majority of corporations list their securities in their home
markets. In 2006, 90% of corporations chose to list their shares in
their home countries,”178 though that number may be lower today
as interest in cross-listing has grown.179 Of course, it is common for
foreign companies to list their shares on a U.S. exchange despite a
primary listing on the exchange of their home market.180 As of
March 31, 2018, there were 502 foreign issuers listed on the NYSE
and NYSE-American from forty-six different countries.181 This
number includes Delaware corporations with business
headquarters abroad. Nasdaq lists 120 non-U.S. companies as
issuers, and, unlike the NYSE report, all 120 appear to be foreign
private issuers.182
However, Spotify is unique, even among other Sweden-based
companies, for refusing to list on the local exchange. Before Spotify,
the NYSE only had one issuer, Autoliv Inc., which the NYSE
classified as a Sweden-based company.183 Autoliv is incorporated
in Delaware, though its principal executive offices are in
Stockholm, Sweden.184 Thus, Autoliv does not actually list on the
NYSE as a foreign private issuer, but as a domestic issuer. Autoliv
is structured as Spotify would be if Spotify maintained its
principal place of business in Luxembourg but was incorporated
in Delaware.
178. Brown, supra note 102, at 396 (citation omitted).
179. See Grabar, supra note 82 (explaining that today many foreign private issuers

list only on a U.S. exchange); see also Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate
Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 152 (2003) (noting an increase in crosslisting interest).
180. Aitken, supra note 1; see also Grabar, supra note 82.
181. Current List of All Non-U.S. Issuers, NYSE (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.nyse.com
/publicdocs/nyse/data/CurListofallStocks.pdf.
182. Companies by Industry, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/
companies-by-industry.aspx?exchange=NASDAQ&market=ADR (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
183. Current List of All Non-U.S. Issuers, supra note 181.
184. Form 8-K, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1034670/0001564
59019001263/alv-8k_20190129.htm.
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Only two Sweden-based issuers are list on Nasdaq, as of April
7, 2018—Ericsson, and Oasmia Pharmaceutical.185 Ericsson is listed
both on Nasdaq, as well as the Stockholm exchange—Nasdaq OXM
Stockholm.186 Ericsson’s Class A and Class B shares trade on the
Stockholm exchange, while ADRs, which represent Class B shares,
trade on Nasdaq New York.187 Oasmia Pharmaceutical also lists on
both exchanges, but like Ericsson, it lists on the U.S. exchange as a
foreign private issuer. So, of the three companies domiciled in
Sweden, Spotify is the odd-company-out that is not cross-listed on
both the Stockholm exchange and a U.S. exchange.
Though Spotify could have cross-listed its shares in the United
States, it chose the direct listing path for reasons that were not at
first obvious. When promoting the offering, Ek, the CEO, explained
that while a traditional path makes sense for some, and that
“[n]ormally, companies don’t pursue a direct listing[,] . . . Spotify
has never been a normal kind of company.”188 In the end, some
suggested the CEO and other executives chose a direct listing to
avoid hefty investment bank fees, time-consuming roadshows,
and, presumably, intensive ongoing reporting requirements. In the
F-1, the company points out that if it did not qualify as a foreign
private issuer, domestic rules would require the filing of “more
detailed and extensive” forms which it would avoid altogether. 189
Of course, if one of Spotify’s reasons for the direct listing was to
avoid paying the investment banks the market-standard seven
percent commission on the offering price,190 it may still have
incurred extensive fees from the investment banks.191 Spotify
engaged three investment banks to serve as financial advisors.192 As
the first large company to conduct a direct listing, there can be little
185. Non US Companies, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companiesby-industry.aspx?exchange=NASDAQ&market=ADR&region=Europe&country=Sweden.
186. Form 20-F, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/717826/000119
312518097690/d648137d20f.htm.
187. Id.
188. Daniel Ek, Spotify Lists on NYSE as SPOT, INSIDE SPOTIFY (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://newsroom.spotify.com/2018-04-02/tomorrow/.
189. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018).
190. Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, Reuters (Mar. 11, 2013)
(calculating that Goldman Sachs made $11.5 million in commissions on the eToys
IPO in 1999).
191. See Grabar, supra note 82 (explaining that today many foreign private issuers list
only on a U.S. exchange).
192. Id.
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doubt that the process required considerable advice from the
banks.193 Naturally, if the direct listing process becomes more
prevalent after Spotify, other companies conducting a direct listing
may benefit from the path paved by Spotify and require less
advisement from the investment banks. Until then, the fees are
likely to remain relatively high, as evidenced by the fact that Slack,
like Spotify, is working with three investment banks in its own
direct listing.194
Regardless, many unicorns and startups could take a lesson
from Spotify on this point of avoiding excessive and unnecessary
expenses. Startups are known for burning through capital, even on
arguably frivolous expenses like $1,300 conference room chairs,
climbing walls, and gourmet meals.195 No doubt, it is encouraging
to see a well-reasoned CEO choosing to move to the public markets
not as some end goal, with an enormous self-initiated media splash,
but as a step toward providing liquidity for employees and
investors who have supported the company.196
However, Spotify’s direct listing, because of the unique
circumstances of being a foreign private issuer, swings the
pendulum too far away from investor protection. In the days
leading up to the IPO, analysts and investors were unsure at what
market price the shares would trade. Private investors had
purchased shares at $132 most recently. When the listing began, the
shares started at $165.90, jumped to $169 a few minutes later, and
then dropped to $149.01 to end the day down 10% from the opening
price.197 More surprising, only 3.1% of Spotify’s outstanding shares
were offered for sale in the first day of trading.198 Analysts were not
sure whether to read the tiny percentage of shares being sold as a
vote of confidence from existing investors who chose not to sell

193. Id.
194. Maureen Farrell, Slack Files to Go Public With Direct Listing, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4,

2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-files-confidentially-to-go-public-with-directlisting-11549301336 (naming Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, and Allen & Co.
as advisors, the same as the advisors to Spotify).
195. Oliver Staley, Startups Could Raise a Lot Less if Their Expenses Weren’t So Lavish,
QUARTZ (Mar. 9, 2018), https://work.qz.com/1222655/startups-could-raise-a-lot-less-iftheir-expenses-werent-so-lavish/ (“The free-spending habits of tech startups are so familiar
they’ve become a cliché.”).
196. Ek, supra note 188.
197. Levine, supra note 15.
198. Id.
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immediately despite no lock-up provision or not. It may have
protected early buyers, but nobody really knew. Either way, from
the standpoint of litigation risk, because such a small percentage of
shares were initially traded, legal writers noted “the size of the class
that can sue and the potential damages may be much smaller, as
the trading may be modest.”199 Without a large, distributed
shareholder base, the economics of being a class action, if it became
necessary, would likely be unworkable. In this case, investors have
less protection than normal without the threat of shareholder class
action—limited though that threat may be.
Even more importantly, the unknowns surrounding the listing
are the conveniences afforded Spotify going forward, which may
come at the expense of investors. Because the company is based in
Luxembourg, it will “face minimal litigation exposure” by listing in
the United States.200 Spotify acknowledged this in its F-1:
We are organized under the laws of Luxembourg and a
substantial amount of our assets are not located in the United
States. It may be difficult for you to obtain or enforce judgments
or bring original actions against us or the members of our board
of directors in the United States.201

As the company pointed out, even if investors did bring
an action against it for a violation, which would be difficult because
of the remoteness of jurisdiction, any resolution attempted to
protect the investors’ interests would be difficult to seize upon.
“[T]he opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders will be
highest when managers’ control of a firm cannot be
challenged internally.”202
In addition, foreign issuers are more likely than domestic
issuers to have concentrated ownership.203 The CEO of Spotify
owns twenty-four percent of the company.204 As mentioned above,

199. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spotify Listing: Can an “Underwriter-less” IPO Attract
Other
Unicorns?, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG
(Jan.
16,
2018),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/01/16/the-spotify-listing-can-an-underwriterless-ipo-attract-other-unicorns/.
200. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1644.
201. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018).
202. Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Crosslisting
Decision, 64 J. FIN. 425, 432 (2009).
203. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1660.
204. Coffee, supra note 199.
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some conflict of interest rules do not apply to directors or
executives, and shareholders going forward have little protection
against the CEO, who, without any sort of lock-up, could sell a
substantial number of shares over a short period of time. Further,
research by other legal writers has shown that from 2000 to 2008,
the SEC “brought enforcement actions against [foreign issuers] at a
rate lower than the rate for domestic issuers . . . .”205 Each of these
factors together provides justification for requiring more
disclosures from a company like Spotify.
Despite these risks, Spotify’s direct listing has encouraged Slack
to pursue its own direct listing, and Airbnb may follow the same
path.206 To accommodate Spotify, the NYSE hastily adopted rules
to allow for direct listings, as it had previously allowed private
listing by private companies interested in allowing their existing
shareholders liquidity only “on a case-by-case basis[.]”207 Nasdaq,
ever in competition with the NYSE for new companies interesting
in listing on a national exchange, and historically the favored
exchange among technology companies208, has since adopted its
own set of rules to allow for direct listings209. Like the NYSE,
Nasdaq previously allowed companies to list shares without
conducting a concurrent IPO.210
Just as Slack’s choice to conduct a direct listing after Spotify
paved the path indicates that Spotify’s choice may have immediate
impacts on the market and future issuers, Nasdaq’s adoption of
direct listing rules signals that more companies may be interested

205. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1693.
206. Theodore Schleifer, Airbnb and Slack are Considering Untraditional IPOs that Box Out

Bankers Like Spotify Did, RECODE (Dec. 10, 2018, 12:46 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018/12
/10/18129880/airbnb-postmates-slack-direct-listing-ipo.
207. Andrew Brady, Phyllis Korff & Michael Zeidel, New NYSE Rules for Non-IPO
Listings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 24, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/24/new-nyse-rules-for-non-ipo-listings/.
208. Eric Newcomer, Uber Picks New York Stock Exchange for Its Mega IPO, Bloomberg
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-21/uber-is-said-topick-new-york-stock-exchange-for-2019-mega-ipo (explaining that “many technology
giants, including Alphabet Inc.’s Google, Microsoft Corp. and Apple Inc. trade on the
Nasdaq, which was once the dominant exchange for tech upstarts going public”).
209. Catherine M. Clarkin, Robert W. Downes & James M. Shea Jr., Updated Nasdaq
Requirements for Direct Listings, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Mar. 18,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/18/updated-nasdaq-requirements-fordirect-listings/.
210. Id.
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in direct listings. Whether the two direct listings are followed by a
third, or a fourth—and on—is an open question, but early
indications clearly suggest direct listings may gain traction.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS—DISCLOSURES AND GUN JUMPING
Unsurprisingly, the solution for preventing harm to investors is
to require more disclosures and apply gun-jumping rules to direct
listings by foreign private issuers.
The tradeoff for accessing the capital of the public markets is
the requirement to provide disclosures and risk liability if those
disclosures are inaccurate. After Spotify’s example, other
companies may come to see direct listings as a viable way to avoid
some of the disclosure requirements required of U.S. companies
issuing shares in an IPO. Securities laws and regulations should be
amended to prevent foreign private issuers conducting direct
listings from bypassing the more extensive disclosures demanded
of domestic corporations conducting IPOs.
In many ways, the direct listing itself does not allow
significantly less robust disclosures. As explained, a registration
statement prepared in accordance with Form F-1 is very similar to
a Form S-1, and investors reviewing the Spotify F-1 saw most of the
same material they would see in an S-1. Rather, the most important
change to the regulations should come after the listing. Foreign
Private Issuers not subject to disclosure requirements under foreign
law should be required under U.S. law to provide interim
disclosures with the same frequency and information as local
issuers. Similarly, foreign private issuers should be required to
provide event-based disclosures after the same occurrences as local
companies are required to file.
In Spotify’s case, the company has essentially conducted its
post-direct listing disclosures with the same frequency and, to a
great degree, the same disclosures as other public companies that
do not qualify as foreign private issuers. In its first year, the
company filed interim reports after each successive three-month
period. Spotify has also provided reports for other current events
on Form 6-K, including disclosures of earnings releases and
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departures of key executives.211 However, because of the relaxed
disclosures, there may be some events that would typically be
disclosed by local issuers, which Spotify has chosen not to disclose.
Without the mandated disclosures, it is difficult to know, and
investors may not have material information they should have.
Of course, we do not want to regulate foreign private issuers
too much. My argument is for stricter disclosure requirements
when a foreign private issuer lists shares only on a U.S. exchange.
This will not affect many companies. “The United States benefits
from foreign private issuers listing on domestic exchanges. And,
U.S. investors find it easier to invest in shares of foreign
companies if they are listed in the United States,”212 allowing U.S.
investors to share in the growth of international companies. Many
of the recent changes to eliminate burdensome disclosures are
effective tradeoffs that eliminate tedious and duplicative
disclosures for the issuer while refraining from subjecting investors
to a high risk of losing access to material information.213 But there
is an important, though elusive, line between encouraging a strong
market and protecting investors.
Next, companies in Spotify’s position—foreign private issuers
registering shares via direct listing only—should be required to
abide by the rules similar to gun-jumping rules that restrict
communications during the period before and during the
registration process. Specifically, such companies should be
required to abide by quiet-period rules and prohibitions
against executives discussing the upcoming offering in the prefiling period.

211. See, e.g., Spotify Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16
or 15d-16 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (Filed Sep. 13, 2018); Spotify
Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (Filed Feb. 6, 2019).
212. Woo, supra note 162.
213. On March 22, 2019, the SEC published highly anticipated final rules to implement
FAST Act disclosure changes, which included allowing companies to exclude portions of the
management discussion and analysis, if those portions were included in a prior filing,
redacting confidential information associated with material agreements, and eliminating the
requirement to provide attachments or schedules to exhibits if the schedules or attachments
contain non-material information. FAST Act Modernization and Simplification of Regulation SK, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 270, 274 & 275 (https://www.sec.gov/rules/final
/2019/33-10618.pdf). These changes are intended to reduce “the costs and burdens on
registrants while continuing to provide all material information to investors.” Id.
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For Spotify, rules that accomplished the same general purpose
as gun-jumping rules may not have made a significant difference.
Such rules would have prevented the company’s executives from
discussing the upcoming listing prior to the time it became
effective, unless those communications were appropriately
recorded and disclosed under exceptions, like a free writing
prospectus. But there has been no clear evidence that the Spotify
executives discussed the offering widely or artificially pumped up
the stock price by generating more interest than is allowed with
typical IPOs. Still, the concern is that other foreign private issuers
may be less inclined to observe the rules required only when shares
are being offered or sold.214 Rules patterned after gun-jumping
rules would introduce a reasonable restriction that minimizes the
risk investors face without significantly constricting interest in
direct listings.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, Spotify’s direct listing garnered a lot of attention
as a potential game changer and rightfully so, it appears,
considering that Slack, a second, large private company, has filed
for its own direct listing. This new pattern may encourage more
companies to list their shares on the public market and allow
corporations to avoid expensive underwriting commissions and, if
the process is adopted widely and efficiencies are developed over
time, onerous fees as well.
A careful examination of the foreign private issuer
qualifications, direct listing and cross-listing practices, and the
regular IPO process suggest that such a transition from IPOs to
standalone direct listings could harm investors, particularly when
conducted by foreign private issuers not subject to local disclosure
rules. Other adjustments to IPO rules were made with the JOBS Act
in 2009, and the results of easing disclosure requirements and
bypassing gun-jumping rules did not, at least in the short term,
proportionately motivate the public market or prompt a substantial
increase in IPOs.215 In the aggregate, investors have not been
harmed by the Spotify direct listing so far. But if the speculations of

214. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012).
215. See generally Scott, supra note 7.
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some observers and analysts prove prescient, a broader trend away
from IPOs could harm investors, because other companies that
follow Spotify’s pattern may not be as well prepared for a direct
listing, as willing to provide interim disclosures as frequently, or
may choose less thorough disclosures if they are not mandated. The
purpose of securities laws is to protect investors and encourage
confidence in public markets while stimulating capital formation.216
If direct listings become more than a surprising phenomenon,
regulators and policymakers are at risk of allowing capital
formation to dominate and neglecting investor protection.
Instead, foreign private issuers that choose the direct listing
route should be required to provide disclosures as if they were
conducting an IPO, especially ongoing disclosures in the months
and years after the direct listing. In addition, companies like Spotify
should be required to adhere to the same gun-jumping rules with
which companies conducting an IPO must comply. By instituting
these changes, regulators and policymakers may restrict capital
formation for a small number of startups that share characteristics
with Spotify while ensuring the thrust of securities laws remains
investor protection.
Tayler Tanner*

216. Id.

* J.D., April 2018, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Thank
you to Professor Christine Hurt for supervising this Note. Thank you to Rebecca and my
family for their support, and thank you to the BYU Law Review students for their valuable
suggestions.
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